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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies firm’s decisions on inventory investment and innovation
activities. The first chapter examines firm inventory behavior. It resolves and simulates
the production smoothing/buffer stock model using different sets of parameters. It shows
that the relationship between a sales shock and inventory investment could be ambiguous
which is different from previous predictions. The production smoothing/buffer stock
model and the (S, s) model of inventory are tested using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset
covering 769 manufacturing firms from 1980 to 1989, and I find that sales are positively
correlated with inventory for raw materials, but negatively correlated with finished goods
inventory in most cases. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions
from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model, contradicting
previous test results. The second chapter examines the relationship between process
innovation and market competition. I find that increased competition will shrink the
demand facing each firm, and firms will have less incentive for process innovation
whether the innovation outcome is deterministic or stochastic. However, when the
number of firms in the market is proportional to the demand and both increase, then
increased price elasticity will induce firms to devote more effort to conduct process
innovation when innovation is deterministic; and under the stochastic case an inverted-U
shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness is identified.
Furthermore, when the number of firms is endogenous, the innovation incentive grows
with the size of the market.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding firm’s behavior is very important to both market participants and
social planners. In this dissertation, I will study firm’s decisions on inventory investment
and innovation activities.
In chapter one, I examine inventory behavior using Chinese firm level data.
Inventory investment is of great economic significance at both the macro and micro
levels. At the macro level, it has been long regarded as a key determinant of business
cycles, and macroeconomists often recognize inventory as a destabilizing factor which
generates economic cycles that would otherwise not exist. At the micro level, however,
inventories are held for various reasons to stabilize a firm’s operation. For instance,
manufacturers store raw materials to shorten future delivery lags and smooth production;
wholesalers and retailers keep sufficient inventory to avoid running out of stock. Many
firms devote a significant amount of time and effort to inventory management. Various
models emerge to explain inventory behavior, and among them, the production
smoothing/buffer stock model prevailed in the early literature. This chapter examines
firm inventory behavior. I resolve and simulate the production smoothing/buffer stock
model using different sets of parameters, and it is shown that the relation between a sales
shock and inventory investment could be ambiguous which differs from predictions in the
literature. The production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model of inventory
are then tested using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms
from 1980 to 1989, and I found that sales are positively correlated with inventory for raw
materials, but negatively correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. These
1

findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions from the production
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model, but contradicts many previous
empirical findings.
In chapter two, the relationship between innovative activities and market
competition is modeled and analyzed. The debate over the effect of increasing market
competition on firms’ innovation activities has been controversial since Schumpeter
(1934). Competition is one of a great many factors that affect a firm’s incentive to
innovate, such as the market structure, the protection of property rights, the ability to
license, uncertainty regarding innovation processes and so on. Market competition can
interact with these other factors, but there is no single model that captures every aspect of
innovation and competition, and therefore the theoretic literature arrives at no consensus
regarding the effects of competition on innovation. Generally, the theoretical literature
examines the relation between innovation and competition with the level of competition
being simply represented by the number of firms which is assumed to be exogenous.
However, in reality the number of firms in a market is determined by market size, scale
economies and other factors such as fixed costs and barriers to entry. For instance, as the
size of the market grows, typically more firms will enter the market to capture available
profits. Thus, I argue an important step in this literature is to allow the number of firms to
be endogenous in a free entry model with zero profit-equilibrium. In this chapter, I first
examine how competition affects innovation effort when the number of firms in the
market is proportional to market demand. In this case, the number of firms grows at the
same rate as the size of the market so that the number of customers facing each firm stays
2

the same. This model allows me to illustrate how competition affects innovation while
neutralizing the scale effect. Then I analyze the effect of competition on innovation when
there is a fixed cost involved in the production. Thus the number of firms in the market
under free entry is endogenously determined by a zero-profit condition. I find that
increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms will have less
incentive for process innovation whether the innovation outcome is deterministic or
stochastic. However, when the number of firms in the market is proportional to the
demand and they both increase, increased price elasticity will induce firms to devote
more effort to conduct process innovation when innovation is deterministic; and in the
case of stochastic innovation an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and
market competitiveness is identified. Furthermore, when the number of firms is
endogenous, the innovation incentive grows with the size of the market.

3

CHAPTER I
A REEXAMINATION OF INVENTORY BEHAVIOR USING
CHINESE FIRM-LEVEL DATA
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I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Gilpatric, for enormous help on this. I also owe to
Dr. Wanamaker, Dr. Shaur, Dr. Celeste and Dr. Petrie for their insightful comments and
generous support. I presented this paper on the brownbag workshop of my department,
and I thank all those who provided helpful suggestions.

Abstract

This paper resolves and simulates the production smoothing/buffer stock model
using different sets of parameters. I show that the relation between a sales shock and
inventory investment could be ambiguous which is different from previous predictions.
The production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model of inventory are tested
using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms from 1980 to
1989. Two main results are found. First, the variance of the annual gross output is
smaller than that of the sales revenue. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show
strong evidence of using inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks.
Second, sales are positively correlated with inventory for raw materials, but negatively
correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. These findings are consistent with
the theoretical predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S,
s) model, contradicting previous test results.

5

1.1 Introduction
Inventory investment is of great importance in economic theory at both the macro
and micro levels. At the macro level, it has been long regarded as a key determinant of
business cycles.1 Macroeconomists often recognize inventory as a destabilizing factor
which generates economic cycles that would otherwise not exist.2 At the micro level,
however, inventories are held for various reasons to stabilize a firm’s operation. For
instance, manufacturers store raw materials to shorten future delivery lags and to smooth
production; wholesalers and retailers store sufficient inventory to avoid running out of
stock. Many firms devote a significant amount of time and effort to inventory
management.3 Why does inventory that stabilizes the microeconomic activities turn out to
destabilize the economy at the macro level? Various models emerge to explain the
inventory behavior, and among them, the production smoothing/buffer stock model4
prevailed in the early literature.
Holt. et. al. (1960) first introduce this model in which a cost minimizing firm
chooses the labor force and output each period to minimize the sum of all future costs.
They find that a demand shock will be absorbed by the work force, overtime hours as

1

Blinder and Maccini (1991) show that, on average, the drop in inventory investment has accounted for
87% of the drop in GNP from 1948 to 1982 in the United States.
2
Figure 2 in the appendix shows the changes in GDP, sales and total inventory in United States.
3
See Larson, Olson and Sharma (2001), Defle and Van (2011) for discussions on the optimal inventory
management.
4
The production smoothing/buffer stock model is also referred as the L-Q model in the inventory literature
because of its functional form is linear-quadratic.
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well as inventory fluctuations. Therefore sales revenue is more volatile than output, and it
covaries negatively with inventory investment.5
However, empirical findings in general are inconsistent with the theoretical
predictions. Empirical studies show that production is more variable than sales in most
industries. Moreover, sales and inventory investment are generally positively correlated.6
This contradiction is considered as a fatal problem of the production smoothing/buffer
stock model. Many economists attempted to modify the production smoothing/buffer
stock model so that the theoretical predictions could match the data. Some modifications
include adding cost shocks and targeted inventory levels, and altering the assumption of
convex production cost. For example, Ramey (1988) argues that marginal cost is falling
instead of rising so that manufacturing firms will bunch rather than smooth production;
Fair(1989), Maccini and Rossana (1984) and Blinder (1986a) suggest that cost shocks
induce firms to raise production and build up inventory when input costs are low; Blinder
(1986b) argues that serial correlation in demand shocks make it inappropriate for firms to
smooth production since the shocks seem to be permanent; Kahn (1987) shows that
higher expected cost of running out of stock when demand increases makes firms hold
more inventory, therefore inventory and sales are positively correlated. Other models also
emerged to provide alternative explanations. Among them the (S, s) model is probably
the most popular one. In this model, firms acquire new inventory to the upper limit of S if

5

Holt. et. al. (1960) discuss these results in chapter 8. Blinder and Maccini (1990) also provide similar
predictions solving a simple version of the production smoothing/buffer stock model.
6
See Blinder (1981, 1986); Blanchard (1983); Haltiwanger and Maccini (1989).
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the current inventory falls below its minimum level of s. If the inventory is anywhere
between s and S, firms will not place a new order. The predictions from this model
conform more closely to the stylized facts.
On the other hand, some studies explain the inconsistency between theory and
data by challenging the empirical test itself instead of the theory. For example, Seitz
(1993) and Schuh (1996) find that inappropriate aggregation over firms will lead to
biased estimated results, and Banerjee and Mizen (2006) argue that inventory and sales
are non-stationary series. They show that the closed form solution for the dynamic model
could get better forecast than the existing model using the UK and US data.
From the perspective of decision makers in a firm, it is important for them to
know how to adjust the inventory level with respect to a demand shock, in order to
maximize profits or minimize costs. The original production smoothing/buffer stock
model of Holt. et. al. (1960) does provide a very sophisticated discussion on the dynamic
responses of inventory to sales fluctuations. However, when solving the model, Holt. et.
al. (1960) evaluate the model at only one set of parameters and show that a positive sales
shock will reduce the inventory level. In this paper, I simulate the production
smoothing/buffer stock model using different sets of parameters, and then find that the
managers will adjust the inventory level differently depending on the type of the firm
when there is a sales shock. For example, firms whose optimal inventory level is
unrelated with its sales are more likely to use inventory as a buffer, while firms holding
an optimal inventory level twice as large as its expected sales will build up the inventory
and increase the inventory level when there is a positive demand shock.
8

Moreover, in the production smoothing/buffer stock model, although labor force
as one of the decision variables is essential to the inventory problem, it is generally
ignored in the empirical estimations in the literature. I will show the importance of
including the labor force in the estimation in the section 1.2.
This paper contributes to the literature in a significant way by simulating the
production smoothing/buffer stock model with different sets of cost parameters, and then
testing it with the labor force included in the estimation. Furthermore, many problems
impeding earlier empirical work have been solved using the rich dataset employed in this
paper. First, the dataset contains two separate types of inventory, finished goods and raw
materials. According to the literature, the production smoothing/buffer stock model is a
better fit for the finished goods inventory held by manufacturers which involves convex
costs, while the (S, s) model may better explain the inventory of the raw materials due to
the fixed cost of delivery. Estimating inventory for finished goods and raw materials
respectively will give us a better understanding of inventory behavior. In the literature,
only a few papers have both types of inventory in their datasets, and, even if they have,
they have not utilized the data fully to test both the production smoothing/buffer stock
model and the (S, s) model.7 Second, the dataset is at the firm level; thus, econometric

7

Schuh (1996) mentions in the paper that the dataset contains inventory by state of fabrication, however,
the study only concentrates on finished goods inventory; Guariglia(1999) also has separate data on finished
goods and raw materials, but the paper focus on examining the effect of financial constraints on the
inventory investment.

9

problems due to aggregation could be avoided.8 Third, although there are quite a few
studies using firm level data, for example, Schuh (1996) uses firm level data is the U.S.
manufacturing industry, and Iturriaga (2000) employs a data set from 172 Spanish firms,
there is no study analyzing the problem in Chinese firms, despite China’s being among
the world’s leading manufacturer.9 A summary of the datasets that have been used to
examine inventory behavior is provided in the Appendix Table 2.
Some interesting results are found in this paper. Simulation in Section 1.2 shows
that the sales shock could be positively correlated with the inventory investment in some
circumstances. Using the Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) dataset, it is shown that
the variance of the annual gross output is smaller than that of the sales revenues at the
aggregate level. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show strong evidence of
using inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks. In addition, sales are
positively correlated with investment in raw materials in all models, but negatively
correlated with finished goods investment in most of the models. These findings are
consistent with the predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the
(S, s) model. Furthermore, the work force is found to be positively correlated with sales
as well as inventory. Therefore, when estimating the effect of sales on inventory, omitting

8

Seitz (1993) and Schuh (1996) find that inappropriate aggregation over firms will lead to biased estimated
results.
9
Iturriaga (2000) has a good summary on the countries that were studied in the inventory problem.

10

the work force will give us a positive bias in the coefficient on the sales.10 This can
possibly explain why most existing empirical papers obtained a positive relationship
between sales and inventory which contradicts the predictions of the production
smoothing/buffer stock model.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the
original versions of the production smoothing/buffer stock model, followed by the
estimation models. Section 1.3 describes the dataset with summary statistics. Section 1.4
estimates the production smoothing/buffer stock model and section 1.5 tests the (S, s)
model. Section 1.6 concludes this paper.

1.2 The model
Holt. et. al. (1960) originally introduced the production smoothing/buffer stock
model in their work of Planning Production, Inventories, and Work Force. The analysis
of inventory behavior for finished goods is based on this model, upon which the
empirical model is built.11
The set up of this model is from the point of view of a production manager.
Assuming the sales volume and the market price are beyond his control, the problem for
him is not to maximize the profits, but to minimize the sum of all expected future costs

10

The work force is positively correlated with both the sales and the inventory, thus if not controlling for
the work force, one unit increase in sales will increase the work force, and the increase in the work force
will increase the inventory as well, which will bias up the effect of the sales on the inventory.
11
Many papers simplified the production smoothing/buffer stock model and get similar predictions, but the
empirical results are not consistent with the theory. See Blinder and Maccini (1990) for a literature review.
Analyzing the original production smoothing/buffer stock model may allow us a better estimation method.
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over a horizon. In every period, the manager has some expectations on the future orders,
and then he decides the number of workers he needs and how many to produce. He could
hire or fire workers at some costs, and once the worker is employed, regular payroll will
be paid. Workers will product the output, and the products are then stocked as inventory.
When an order is received by the manager, he needs to choose between fluctuation in the
inventory and the production. On one hand, a big fluctuation in the inventory level means
that additional storage costs will be involved when inventory is high, and running out of
stock may occur if inventory is low. On the other hand, the manager could meet the
demand through flexible production. When demand is high, he could hire more workers
or asked them to work overtime; and when the demand is low, layoffs or idle time may be
involved. Thus, four main costs are involved in planning production and employment,
which are regular payroll, hiring and firing costs, overtime costs, and inventory holding
and back order costs.12 The managers will consider and compare all these costs, and the
firm’s objective is then to minimize the sum of these costs over a horizon. The production
smoothing/buffer stock model is:13


 ,, ,  ,,



 


                   


        ! "  #  $ %    &

2  1

12

For more discussions on the costs involved in planning production and employment, see chapter 2 in
Holt. et. al. (1960).
13
Holt. el. al.(1960) state that it is not necessary to place non-negativity restraints on the variables. A
negative value, such as negative production, will be undesirable because they are expensive, and these
actions will be automatically avoided in cost minimization. Also an interior cost minimum exists if
C2,C3,C4 and C7 are positive and 0 +  + 4  .

12

Subject to:  %  "  "

2  2

In this model, I am minimizing the total cost which is the sum of all the future
costs, where CT is the total cost, C1-C12 are the parameters, Wt is the work force, Yt is the
aggregate production, It is the inventory and St is the ordered shipments. Notations are
consistent with those in Holt. el. al. (1960) so that comparisons between the solutions
could be better discussed.
Among various costs, four main costs are included in the cost function and related

to the decision in the production and the labor force as discussed earlier.     is

the regular payroll cost which is a linear function, where  is the average wage rate and

 is some fixed cost component;        is the cost of hiring and layoffs

which increases with both more or less workers,  makes the costs asymmetrical so that

it is more general;                 is the overtime costs,

where  is the average production rate, and the more actual production is, the more

overtime cost will be for a given size of the work force;14 and ! "  #  $ %  is the

inventory holding and back order costs, where #  $ % is the optimal inventory, and the

14

The overtime cost is better measured as a quadratic function: if there are only a few more products
needed, then only several workers will be asked to work overtime and the cost is low; but if lots of products
are required, then more workers are involved and the overtime costs will increase faster. Although the
approximation to the cost is poor when the production is low, the quadratic function is fit in the relevant
range as Holt. el. al. (1960) stated. The other three terms  ,   , and    are for better
approximation.

13

more deviation from the optimal inventory level, the more inventory holding cost will be
involved.15
In every period, the inventory in the last period will be carried over to the next
period, and the net of the production and the sales will be stored as inventory, so the

constraint should be held, which is that the inventory in this period " is the inventory in
the last period " plus the production  and the current sale % .

The first-order conditions for this minimization problem can be obtained by

differentiating CT with respect to each decision variables, which are {Y1,…,YT} and
{W1,…,WT}. Solving a system of the first-order conditions yields Wt and Yt. Using
equation 2  2, I obtain the decision rules for the inventory:


"  -   - 1"   - %.  - 
.

2  316

Where C is a vector of the parameters in CT.

Equation 2  3 indicates that inventory in period t is a function of the labor

force in previous periods, the past inventory, and all future expected sales. Holt. et. al.
(1960) evaluate inventory behavior given certain values of the cost parameters, and
obtained negative sign on St. They also show that the change in sales will be absorbed by
the inventory, work force and overtime hours, so that all three served as buffers and
smooth out the production. Therefore, variance in production will be less than that in

15
16

More discussions on the cost terms could be found in chapter 4 in Holt. el. al. (1960).
See the derivation in the appendix. Equation (2-3) is the same with the equation (21) in the appendix.
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sales; and inventory is negatively correlated with sales.17 This conclusion has been
widely used in the inventory literature, and referred as the production smoothing/buffer
stock model. However, this result is derived using only one set of parameters, which is
not conclusive. It is still an open area for us to determine the effects of sales on inventory
robustly.
While it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution regarding the signs on sales,
simulation can be used to further the analysis. Taking the values of the parameters
presented in Holt. et. al. (1960), I vary one parameter, holding all others the same, and

obtain the corresponding coefficients of sales on inventory, that is -  in equation 2 
3. In particular, the cost of hiring and layoffs and inventory holding costs are of high

interests, which are related to C2 and C7. In order to examine the importance of the labor
force in the regression model, I also obtain the coefficient of the sales on the labor force,
which is 1  in equation (18) in the appendix.

Figure 3 in the appendix shows the corresponding coefficients when varying C2,

the hiring and layoff costs, between 0.1 and 1. The upper figure is the coefficients of
sales on inventory. Controlling for the initial labor force, when the current sales increase,
inventory decreases. But when the expected sales in the next period increase, inventory
will be built up; and the effects of the third period sales on current inventory are
negligible.18 The lower figure of the panel presents the coefficients of sales on the labor

17

The dynamic response of inventory, labor force and production to sales fluctuations is discussed in
Chapter 8 in Holt. el. al. (1960).
18
The effects of the sales in fourth period or later on inventory are also negligible.
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force, and it shows that when current sales go up, the labor force will go up, and thus
more goods are produced, and invenotry will be built up. From this panel, I also find that
as C2 increase, that is with higher layoff costs, more inventory will be used and
workforce adjustment is empolyed to accommodate the sales.
Figure 4 examines the corresponding coefficients when varying C7, the inventory
holding costs, between 0.1 and 1. I find that inventory also decrease as current sales
increase whatever the inventory holding cost is, but when there is a high inventory
holding cost, firm will prefer to hire more workers for production and inventory will not
deviate from the optimal level too much.
However, when I vary the vaules of some cost parameter, different conclusions
are obtained. Figure 5 presents how sales shock affects inventory and workers when
varying the multiplier for the optimal inventory level from 0 to 1. When the optimal
inventory level is more proportional to the sales, firms will tend to build up more
inventory to reduce the inventory holding cost, and more workers are hired to produce the
required amount. Thus, as the multiplier for the optimal inventory level increases,
inventory may swtich from decresing to increasing as the current sales increases. This is a
new finding from solving the production smoothing/buffer stock model, and it tells that
inventory could be positively correlated with the current sales.
Figures 6 and 7 are produced when changing the value of C9, the mulitiplier for
the optimal inventory level, from 0 to 1. From figure 6 I find that inventory increase as
current sales increase at every value of C2, the hiring and layoff costs. This contradicts
the original prediction of the production smoothing/buffer stock model. The optimal
16

inventory level was unrelated with the sales in the figures 3 and 4, but now is the same
size as the sales. Thus, when the sales increases, the inventory will also need to be built
up in order to reduce the inventory holding costs. Figure 7 shows that the inventory will
be build up at a constant rate whatever the inventory holding costs C7 is. This may be due
to the value of the mulitiplier for the optimal inventory level C9 I set up. The cost of
deviating optimal inventory level is high enough to ensure the stock of the inventory will
follow a pattern.
Based on the discussions above, the effect of a sales shock on inventory
investment could be negative or positive depending on the assignment of the cost
parameters. In addition, the labor force should be included in the estimation. Omitting the
labor force variable will cause serious bias in the results because it is correlated with
sales; thus bias the coefficient on the sales upward. I focus on the sales in current and
next period since later periods have trivial effects on inventory. The empirical model is
thus:

"  23  2 "  2   2 %  2 %4  5

2  4

1.3 The Data
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
The dataset employed in this paper comes from a large-scale survey of Chinese
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) from 769 manufacturing firms between 1980 and 1989.
Enterprises were sampled from four provinces in China: Shanxi from the north, Jilin in
the northeast, Jiangsu in the coastal region, and Sichuan in the southwest. The sample

17

covers several industries, such as Mining & Utilities, Light Manufacturing, Chemical,
Heavy Manufacturing, and others, which represents China’s overall industrial structure.
A total of 160 firms were dropped due to incomplete data, of which, the operating
year of 43 firms started after 1980 and thus didn’t have the complete time span for the
analysis. Further, firms with a zero or missing values for the key variables such as
production, total inventory, sales revenue of products and total labor force, were dropped
as well.
A rich set of variables are available to examine inventory behavior by stage of
fabrication: raw materials and finished goods. The summary statistics of relevant
variables for analysis are shown in Appendix Table 3.
According to Blinder and Maccini (1991), investment in manufacturers’ finished
goods inventory is the smallest components of total inventory investment, and raw
materials held by manufacturers are the most volatile components of total inventory
investment. In this dataset, the mean and variance as well as coefficient of variation (CV)
for investment in raw materials are 564,500 RMB, 1,653,280 RMB and 2.93 respectively,
compared with that for the finished goods, 137,900 RMB, 390,750 RMB and 2.83, which
is consistent with the findings in Blinder and Maccini.
The standard deviation and CV of the annual gross output are smaller than that of
the sales revenues of products. This result is contrary to most empirical literature, but
more consistent with the prediction of production smoothing/buffer stock model, in
which firms use inventory to smooth out production. However, when broken down by
industries, sizes and locations, mixed results are presented in table 4. In particular, small
18

firms in heavy industry show strong evidence of using inventory to smooth out
production and buffer demand shocks. One explanation for this is that small firms have
lower production capacity and it takes longer time to produce one unit of product in
heavy industry. Inventory is expected to be used especially when demand is high.
1.3.2 The Applicability of the Data
Although China was a planned economy after 1949, a series of reforms of SOEs
were undertaken beginning in 1978 to motivate managers and workers to be more
productive.19 For example, one of the policies is to allow firms to retain a portion of their
profits if they fulfill the targets, or pay penalty when a loss occurs. The reforms stimulate
the managers of SOEs to reduce costs in pursuing higher profits.20 The government also
implemented the State-owned Enterprise Cost Management Regulations on March 5th of
1984, which provided detailed guidance to induce SOEs to control the cost. It is
reasonable to assume that managers of SOEs at this time had strong incentives to
minimize some costs, such as the inventory holding cost, machine setup cost, shortage
cost, overtime cost, and hiring and firing costs which are the components in the
production smoothing/buffer stock model. Furthermore, even if firms did not minimize
the regular payroll because managers in SOEs were incentive to pay higher wages or
bonuses than would be costing minimizing, this would not be important of our study. All

19

See discussions about SOE reforms in Groves et al.(1994), Lee(1999), Choe and Yin (2000), Ying(2001),
Dong and Putterman (2002).
20
Groves et al.(1994) show that the profit retention rates rises from a mean of 24% in 1980 to 63% in 1989.
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that is required for our analysis is cost minimizing behavior regarding production and
employment decision conditional on wages.
The SOE managers were also given greater flexibility to decide output and output
price. As for the labor force, temporary workers were also employed for production
flexibility, and managers are allowed to send the redundant workers home and pay them a
very low wage.21 More importantly, the cost of hiring and firing are involved in the
model, so even if the firm did not have great flexibility in hiring and layoffs, the model
itself has the ability to respond this constraint.
Based on the discussions above, the production smoothing/buffer stock model
could be tested using this dataset.

1.4 Estimation Results

According to the equation 2  4 from the production smoothing/buffer stock

model, inventory and the labor force in the last period, and current period and next period
sales are used as the explanatory variables. The effects of the sales after the next period
are negligible from the simulation results, so they are not included in the estimation.
Thus, the following model is used to examine inventory behavior on the finished
goods.
ln inventoryit = β 0 + β1 ln inventoryi , t −1 + β 2 ln labori , t −1 + β 3 ln salesi ,t
+ β 4 ln salesi , t +1 + vt + ε it

21

(4 - 1)

See Groves et al.(1994) and Yin (2001).
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Two econometric problems may arise from estimating equation 4  1. First, the

presence of the lagged dependent variable may give rise to autocorrelation; second, the

time-invariant firm characteristics, such as firm size and location, may be correlated with
the explanatory variables. To cope with the problems, Arrellano-Bond estimator is used
for estimation.
The coefficient on sales is of the highest interest. In particular, I want to see what
the sales shock effects will be after controlling for the labor force. The main results are
summarized in the table below, which compares the results between models with

different control variables. Equation 4  1 will also be estimated for all firms as well as

by different firm sizes and industries and corresponding results could be found in tables 5
and 6 in the appendix.
Table 1 Test for the Effect of a Sales Shock on Inventory
Model

(1)

(2)

(3)

ln(sales)

0.047
(0.0627)

-0.251***
(0.0733)

-0.253***
(0.0721)

Labor force included

N

N

Y

FE

N

Y

Y

Fit

0.68

0.25

0.55

N

1962

1962

1962

Note: The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the observed and the
predicted value.

The first specification is the basic model, which only uses the sales as the
explanatory variable. The production smoothing/buffer stock model gets a positive effect
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of the sales shock on inventory. Model 2 includes the time fixed effects, and the sales
shock effect becomes negative. Some time trends, such as the ever-changing macro
economy environment, the political or merchandise policies, will play an important role
in the industry, which affect the manufacturers’ performances in various circumstances.
Thus, ignoring the time fixed effects in the model may cause biased results. Finally, when
adding the labor force in the model, a negative effect of the sales shock on the finished
goods is obtained for the production smoothing/buffer stock model as well. The
coefficient for the model without the labor force is -0.251, which is greater than that for
the one with the labor force, -0.253, which confirms that omitting the labor force in the
production smoothing/buffer stock model will bias up the effect of the sales shock on the
inventory.22

Tables 5 and 6 show us the estimation results from equation 4  1 by different

firm sizes and industries. The coefficients on sales are negative and significant in most of
these models, and the one exception is for the “other industries” category. This finding is
consistent with the predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model; that is,
sales are negatively correlated with investment in finished goods in most cases. The
coefficient for the other industry is positive but insignificant. That may be due to the
mixed properties of the firms. The coefficients on the sales in the next period are all
insignificant which confirms that the effects of future sales on inventory investment are
negligible. The mining and heavy industries have the largest impact of sales shock on

22

See footnote 10 for more details.
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inventory.. As we know, the products in the mining and heavy sector are more
complicated
icated so that it takes more time to produce when a new order is placed, that is, the
average production rate is relatively low. From the simulation changing the parameter of
the average production rate C4, I find
d that the lower the average production rate is, the
more the inventory will be consumed when there is a positive sales shock, which is
consistent with the empirical results for the mining and heavy industries.

Coeffcients of Sales on Inventory
0.7158
0.7632
0.8105
0.8579
0.9053
0.9526
1

0.3368
0.3842
0.4315
0.4789
0.5263
0.5737
0.6211
0.6684

0.2421
0.2895

-0.5

0.1
0.1474
0.1947

0

-1

h5

-1.5
t=1
-2
-2.5
-3

C4
Figure 1 Coefficients of Sales
ales on Inventory When Changing Values of the Average
Production Rate C4
Note: This graph shows the coeffcients of sales on inventory from testing the production
smoothing/buffer stock model from equation (21) when changing values of the parameter of the
average production rate C4. The horizonal axis is the parameter of the average production rate,
C4.
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The lagged inventory investment is significantly correlated with inventory
investment in all models except testing for the small firms, and thus Arrellano-Bond
estimator is reasonable for the estimation.
The effect of the labor force on inventory is also of our interest. Holt. et. al.
(1960) point out that, when the labor force in the last period increases, total production
will rise and inventory will be piled up. Labor can also be used to buffer demand shocks,
and hence β2 in the equation 4  1 are expected to be positive. The results show the
coefficients on the lag of the labor are almost all significantly positive as expected.
Table 7 examines that the effect of sales shock on the labor. Based on the
equation (18) from the appendix, the following specification is employed using
Arrellano-Bond estimation.
ln laborit = β 0 + β1 ln labori ,t −1 + β 2 ln inventory i ,t −1 + β 3 ln salesi , t + β 4 ln salesi ,t +1
+ vt + ε it

(4 - 2)

The labor force and the sales are significantly positively correlated. If not
controlling for the work force, one unit increase in sales will increase the work force, and
the increase in the work force will increase the inventory as well, which will bias up the
effect of the sales on the inventory. Therefore, leaving the labor force in the error term
will positively bias the effect of the demand shock on inventory.
Furthermore, from the simulation results in section 1.2, when layoff costs C2
increases, more inventory is used and less workers are adjusted to accommodate a
positive sales shock. Equation 4  3 is used to test for this prediction.
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ln inventory it = β 0 + β1 ln inventory i , t −1 + β 2 ln labori , t −1 + β 3 ln sales i , t
+ β 4 ln sales i , t +1 + β 5layoff cos t * ln sales i ,t + vt + ε it

(4 - 3)

In the data set, there is one categorical variable that represents how much
flexibility the manager has to fire a worker. There are total five levels: no flexibility, a
little bit, some, quite a bit and flexible. Only 1.18% of the firms have complete flexibility
to fire a worker, and 8.42% of them have quite a bit flexibility, then followed by 26.6%,
41.25% and 22.56% (refer to table 8). I used this variable as a proxy to the layoff costs.
The more flexibility the manager has to fire a worker, the less layoff cost it will be in this
firm.
Since there are five discrete levels for the layoff costs, dummies are generated for
each level, and then interact with the sales respectively. If the estimation results are
consistent with the prediction, the coefficients on the interaction terms should be smaller
for the higher layoff cost. The results in table 9 conforms this hypothesis. All interactions
are significant and decreasing in trend as the layoff cost increases.

1.5 Estimating the (S, s) model
There are two measures of inventory in general, manufacturing inventory and
trade inventory. Trade inventory composes an important part of total inventory, which is
even more than manufacturing inventory.23 The production smoothing/buffer stock model
discussed above assumes a firm minimizes the expected costs when planning production
and this is a better fit for manufacturing inventory, especially the finished goods they

23

Refer to figure 8 in the appendix.
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produce. However, I can’t use the same model to examine trade inventory since retailers
and wholesalers are not involved in production. Instead, the (S, s) model is one of the
most popular models to explain trade inventory behavior.
Under the (S, s) model, a representative firm selects its inventory level to
minimize the expected value of the sum of discounted costs in all future periods.24 Unlike
the production smoothing/buffer stock model, there are three types of costs involved, the
purchasing cost, inventory holding cost and shortage costs. The model predicts that firms
order a shipment if the initial inventory falls below a critical value of S, but won’t buy
more as long as the inventory stays above the critical value of s. Scarf (1959) finds that as
long as the inventory holding and shortage costs are convex and ordering cost is some
fixed costs plus the value of purchased goods, the results will always hold without any
additional conditions.
Under the (S, s) policy, it is intuitive to see that firms will order a shipment and
the inventory level will be restored if inventory falls below s due to a demand shock. As a
result, there is a positive relationship between inventory and demand shock. In addition,
output (in terms of purchasing) will be more volatile than sales. Most empirical papers
found positive results for the (S, s) model.
The decision to hold raw materials by manufacturers is quite similar to retailers
and wholesalers hold finished goods inventory since they all involve a fixed delivery
cost. Estimating inventory for finished goods and raw materials respectively will give us

24

Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) set up the problem of minimizing discounted costs using the (S, s)
policy but didn’t solve it. Scarf (1959) proves that the optimal inventory policy is indeed the (S, s) form.
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a better understanding of inventory behavior. Following the literature, I include the sales
and one lag of the inventory in the estimation.25 The model specification is:

ln inventoryit = β 0 + β1inventoryi , t −1 + β 2 ln salesi ,t + vt + ε it

(5 - 1)

The Arrellano-Bond estimator is used for estimation as well, and the coefficient
on sales is of the highest interest. The production smoothing/buffer stock model predicts
it to be negative in most cases, but the (S, s) model show it is positive. Tables 10 and 11
provide us the estimation results by different firm sizes and industries. The coefficient on
sales are all significantly positive in all models which is consistent with the predictions
from the (S, s) model. The explanation to the opposite signs is intuitive. When there is a
positive demand shock, manufacturers will place more orders of raw materials and
accelerate production, so investment in raw materials will increase. However, it takes
time to produce. If firms couldn’t make enough products to meet the demand, inventory
will be used as a buffer; hence investment in finished goods will decline.
In order to have a better sense on how well the models fit the data, I examine the
model fit and the residue plot for each regression. The model fit is calculated using the
square of the correlation between the observed and the predicted value, and reported in
the table. The model fits are fairly strong, most of which are higher than 0.5, which
indicates that the predicted value has a high correlation with the observed value, and the
model fits the data well. I also do residue plot for all regressions and present two

25

See Blinder and Maccini (1990) for a literature review. It will be also interesting to examine the effects of
the delivery and purchasing cost on the inventory investment. However, since the cost function is
discontinuous, the analytical solution is difficult to derive. I may resort to simulation for future work.
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representative plots in the figure 9 in the appendix, which are from testing the production
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model using the full data. Residues are
distributed randomly around zero against the predicted values for most regressions, and
all these analyses support that both models are good fits for the data.

1.6 Concluding Remarks
Two theories that explain the behavior of inventory investment are the production
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model. The production smoothing/buffer
stock model introduced by Holt. et. al. (1960) is a better fit for manufacturing inventory,
especially the finished goods. It predicts that sales revenue is more volatile than output,
and it covaries negatively with inventory investment. However, empirical findings
obtained opposite results: the production is more variable than sales in most industries,
and sales and inventory investment are generally positively correlated. Hence, economists
began to doubt the applicability of the production smoothing/buffer stock model. By
analyzing the original production smoothing/buffer stock model, ambiguous relation
between a sales shock and inventory investment are obtained. In addition, the labor force
is found to be a crucial component of the model and excluding it from the estimation will
lead to biased results. To date, this is the first paper that considers the impact of the labor
force in the empirical test of inventory behavior.
Using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms from
1980 to 1989, finished goods inventory is used to test the production smoothing/buffer
stock model which involves the rising marginal cost when planning production, while
inventory of the raw materials is applied to test the (S ,s) model assuming a fixed delivery
28

cost. I find that the variance of the annual gross output is smaller than that of the sales
revenues of products. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show strong evidence to
use inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks. Moreover, sales are
positively correlated with investment in raw materials, but negatively correlated with
finished goods inventory in most cases. This is consistent with the predictions from both
the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model. Furthermore, the labor
force is found to be positively related with demand as well as the inventory, which
indicates that excluding the labor force in the estimation will cause biased results. This
explains why previous studies found contradicting results to the theoretical predictions.
While it is crucial to include the labor force in the estimation, some other
variables could also be important in the analysis. For example, some literature studies the
effect of cost shocks and financial constraints on inventory investment. If these variables
are also correlated with both the inventory and one or more regressors, then omitted
variable bias will occur. I would like to explore this further in the future, and include
more variables in the estimation to see if any other factor is crucial to be included when
analyzing the effect of sales shock on inventory.
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Appendix
Derivation of the decision rule for inventory
The production smoothing/buffer stock model is
min

 ,, ,  ,,



 


                   


        ! "  #  $ %    &
Subject to:  %  "  "

1

(2)

where CT is the total cost;

Wt is the work force;
Yt is the aggregate production;
It is the inventory;
St is the ordered shipments;
C1Wt+C13 is the regular payroll cost;
C2(Wt – Wt-1 – C11)2 is the cost of hiring and layoffs;
C3(Yt – C4Wt )2+ C5Yt- C6Wt+ C12 Yt Wt is the overtime costs;
C7(It – (C8+ C9St ))2 is the inventory, back order and machine setup costs.
Take partial derivatives of E(CT) with respect to {W1,…,WT} to obtain:
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Solving Equations (3) & (4) for Yt yields:
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Then taking partial derivatives of E(CT) with respect to {Y1,…,YT}to find:
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From equation (7) I obtain:
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When r=1, equation (8) turns to be:
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When r=2, equation (8) turns to be:
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Subtract equation (10) from equation (9) yields :

2! "  2       2        2! $ %  2! # 11

Similarly I obtain the following equation:

2! ":  2 :4  :    2   :4  :   2! $ %:  2! # where r
 1,2, … T  1 12

When r=T, equation (8) turns to be:
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From equation (12) I obtain
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Combining equation (2), (11), (12), (13) & (14) yields:
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Substitute equation (5) & (6) into equations (15)-(17) to eliminate Yt, obtaining a system
of equations:
$   3   !   1  $ %    ! 3  # 
! :   :   :   :4  ! :4
 $ %:  1  $ % 

3
 "3


3
J-KDK r  2, … T  2


!         3   $ %  1  $ % 
!         $ %  1  $ % 

where C10=C1-C6

3


 3
3 


 2! ! 

C14≡2C3C4-C12
C15≡2C2/C14
C16≡2C3C42/C14
C17≡C3C15/C7
C18≡C3C16/C7-C14/2C7
C19≡C16+C18+2C15+3C17
C20≡C15+3C17+C18
C21≡C15+4C17+C18
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C22≡C16+2C18+2C15+6C17
C23≡C16+2C15
C24≡ C16+2C18+C15+3C17
This system has T unknown variables and T equations, and I write it in a matrix form
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Solving this system of equations I obtain Wt. Thus, conditional on the initial values of
workers Wt-1 and inventories It-1, I find the following decision rule:


  1   1 "   1 %.  1 
.



4  1   1 "   1! %.  1# 
.

18
19
37

Where C is a vector of the cost parameters in CT, and fi(C) is a function that only
depends on C.

From equation (12), (18) and (19), we could see that : YZ :4 are correlated

with ": as well as %: . Thus, if I examine the effect of sales on inventory without

considering the effect of : YZ :4 , in other words, I regress inventory on sales,
leaving the labor force in the error term, there will be a bias.

One way to fix this problem is to find instruments for : YZ :4 . From

equation (18) and (19), we could see that  is correlated with : YZ :4 , and also
it is predetermined. So it is good to use  as an instrument for both : YZ :4 .
Substitute equation (18) & (19) into equation (5), I obtain


  -   - "   - %.  - 
.

20

Using equation (2), I could get another decision rule for the inventory:


"  -   - 1"   - %.  - 
.
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Figure 2 Changes in GDP, Inventories and Sales in Billions of Current Dollars
Note: All data are seasonally adjusted and in billions of current dollars. GDP is obtained from
BEA. Inventory data includes manufacturer and trade inventory, and is extracted from U.S.
Census Bureau.
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Figure 3 Coefficients When
Note: These two graphs show the coeffcients from testing the equation (18) and (21)) when
changing values of the parameter of the layoff cost, C2. The horizonal axis is the parameter of the
layoff cost, C2. The first graph shows the coeffcients of sales on inventory from equation (21),
(2 and
the second graph shows coeffcients of sales on workers from equation (18)
(18). The blue line is
associated with the current sales, the red line with the second period sales, and the green line
with the third period sales.
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Figure 4 Coefficients When
hen Changing Values of the Inventory Holding Cost
C C7
Note: These two graphs show the coeffcients from testing the equation (18) and (21)) when
changing values of the parameter of the inventory holding costs, C7. The horizonal axis is the
parameter of the inventory holding costs
costs, C7. The first graph shows the coeffcients of sales on
inventory from equation (21),, and the second graph shows coeffcients of sales on workers from
equation (18). The blue line is associated with the current sales, the red line with the second
period sales, and the green line with the third period sales.
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Figure 5 Coefficients When
hen Changing Values of the Multiplier for the Optimal
O
Inventory Level C9
Note: These two graphs show the coeffcients from testing the equation (18) and (21)) when
changing values of the mulitipler for the optimal inventory level
level, C9. The horizonal axis is the
parameter of the multiplier
er for the optimal inventory level
level, C9. The first graph shows the
coeffcients of sales on inventory from equation (21), and the second graph shows coeffcients of
sales on workers from equation (18)
(18). The blue line is associated with the current sales, the red
line with the second period sales, and the green line with the third period sales.
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Figure 6 Coefficients When
Note: This panel is comparable to the panel 1 expect that the parameter value of C9 is changed
from 0 to 1. These two graphs show the coeffcients from testing the equation (18) and (21) when
changing values of the parameter of the layoff cost, C2. The horizonal axis is the parameter of the
layoff cost, C2. The first graph shows the coeffcients of sales on inventory from equation (21),
(2 and
the second graph shows coeffcients of sales on workers from equation (18)
(18). The blue line is
associated with the current sale
sales,
s, the red line with the second period sales, and the green line
with the third period sales.
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Figure 7 Coefficients When
hen Changing Values of the Inventory Holding Cost
C C7
Note: This panel is comparable to the panel 3 expect that the parameter value of C9 is changed
from 0 to 1. These two graphs show the coeffcients from testing the equation (18) and (21) when
changing values of the parameter of the inventory holding costs, C7. The horizonal axis is the
parameter of the inventory holding costs
costs, C7. The first graph shows the coeffcients of sales on
inventory from equation (21),, and the second graph shows coeffcients of sales on workers from
equation (18). The blue line is assoc
associated
iated with the current sales, the red line with the second
period sales, and the green line with the third period sales.
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Figure 8 Manufacturing and Trade Inventory
Note: All data are seasonally adjusted and in millions of current dollars. Obtained from U.S.
Census Bureau.
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Figure 9 Residue Plots for Estimating the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock
Model and the (S, s) Model
Note: The upper figure is the residues against the predicted values from estimating equation (4-1).
The lower figure is the residues against the predicted values from estimating equation (5-1).
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Table 2 Survey of the Datasets Used to Examine Inventory Behavior
Paper

Data

Miron and Zelds
(1988)

Industrial level data for US
firms from May 1967 to
December 1982

Cuthbertson and
Gasparro (1993)
Hay and Louri
(1994)

Schuh (1996)

Aggregated data from 1968:1 to
1989:4 in UK
Annually data for UK quoted
companies in 13 different
industrial sector in the period
1960-85
Firm-level data in U.S.
manufacturing industry
from1985 to 1993.

Allen (1997)

Firm-level data for US firms
from 1981:1 to 1991:1

Carpenter, Fazzari
and Petersen (1998)

Firm-level data for US firms
from 1981:3 to 1992:4

McCarthy and
Zakrajsek (1998)
Guariglia (1999)

Fafchamps,
Gunning and
Oostendorp (2000)
Iturriaga (2000)

Banerjee and Mizen
(2006)

Firm-level data for
manufactures, retails and whole
sales trade firms from 1981:4 to
1997:4
Annually data for 994 UK
manufacturing firms from 1968
to 1991

Variables
Inventory, sales, interest rate,
tax rate, wages, price of raw
materials and energy, capital
stock, monthly precipitation
and temperature
Inventory and output, capital
gearing
Balance sheet and profit and
loss account
Sales and inventories by stageof-fabrication: finished goods,
work-in process and raw
materials
Inventory and sales
Inventory, Sales, cash stock,
cash flow and coverage ratio

Inventory and sales

Total, work-in-process and raw
materials inventories, sales and
coverage ratio
Inventories for raw materials,
Firm-level data for Zimbabwean work-in-process and finished
manufacturing firms from 1993 goods, sales, contractual risks,
to 1995
variables related liquidity
constraints
Firm-level data of 172 Spanish
Total inventories, sales,
firms from July 1990 to
finished goods variation and
December 1995
material variation
Aggregated data for US and UK
from 1982:1 to 2001:2

Inventory and sales
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Table 2. Continued.
Paper
Data
Firm-level data for US
manufacturers from 1975:1 to
Tsoukalas (2006)
1995:4.
Herrera,
Murtazashvili nd
Pesavento (2008)

Firm-level data for US firms
from January 1659 to March
2000

Variables
Inventory and cash flow

Inventory by stages of
production and sales
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Table 3 Summary Statistics on Selected Variables
CV

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Annual gross output

3187.10

10314.17

3.24

Sales revenue of products

3152.54

11040.72

3.50

Total inventory

1024.1

2263.28

2.21

Raw materials

564.50

1653.28

2.93

Finished goods

137.90

390.75

2.83

Total number of workers

1902.95

5451.11

2.86

( Coefficient of Variation)

Note: All variables are in ten thousands of RMB except the total numbers of workers.
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Table 4 Standard Deviation of Output and Sales by Firm Sizes, Locations and
Industries
Output
(Ten thousands of
RMB)

Sales
(Ten thousands of
RMB)

Firm size
Large firm
Medium firm
Small firm

19891.32
3397.01
1214.09

21249.08
3311.91
3497.67

Location
Ji Lin(northeast)
Jiang Su(coastal region)
Shan Xi(north)
Si Chuan(southwest)

15811.28
5763.54
9342.92
4243.33

17380.3
5339.38
9806.05
3977.91

Industry
Chemical industry
Heavy industry
Light industry
Mining industry
Other

18855.9
4881.414
4699.36
18869.94
5994.50

19380.82
7258.23
5642.05
18322.43
5677.77
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Table 5 Test for the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock model by Different Firm
Sizes
Variable

All firms

Small firms

Medium firms

Large firms

ln(inventory).L1

0.406***
(0.0544)

0.394***
(0.1101)

0.446***
(0.0603)

0.388***
(0.0889)

ln(sales)

-0.253***
(0.0721)

-0.331**
(0.1143)

-0.103
(0.1109)

-0.444***
(0.1177)

ln(sales_n+1)

-0.095
(0.0653)

-0.146
(0.1134)

-0.116
(0.1170)

0.015
(0.1040)

ln(labors).L1

0.440*
(0.2665)

1.007**
(0.5035)

0.291
(0.3380)

0.730***
(0.4341)

Fit

0.55

0.45

0.54

0.75

N

1962

496

936

530

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-1). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.
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Table 6 Test for the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock Model by Different
Industries
Variable

Mining

Light

Chemical

Heavy

Other

0.144
(0.1950)

0.387***
(0.0736)

0.198**
(0.0903)

0.337***
(0.0832)

0.410***
(0.1097)

ln(sales)

-0.371
(0.3814)

-0.309
(0.2479)

-0.187*
(0.1051)

-0.451***
(0.1022)

0.058
(0.0938)

ln(sales_n+1)

-0.012
(0.3266)

-0.110
(0.1652)

-0.266***
(0.1020)

-0.032
(0.0907)

0.051
(0.1724)

ln(labors).L1

2.332***
(0.9216)

1.044**
(0.4261)

1.4255***
(0.5120)

-0.360
(0.3815)

0.119
(0.3519)

Fit

0.59

0.51

0.67

0.02

0.65

N

84

438

374

824

242

ln(inventory).
L1

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-1). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.
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Table 7 Test for the Effect of a Sale Shock on the Labor Force
Variable

All firms

Small firms

Medium firms

Large firms

ln(labor).L1

0.157
(0.0989)

0.227***
(0.0828)

0.144
(0.1533)

0.330***
(0.1017)

ln(inventory).L1

-0.002
(0.0029)

-0.004
(0.0049)

-0.0003
(0.0051)

0.004
(0.0062)

ln(sales)

0.0559***
(0.0101)

0.070***
(0.0214)

0.0673***
(0.0165)

0.035**
(0.0149)

ln(sales_n+1)

0.0255***
(0.0077)

0.039***
(0.0123)

0.0042
(0.0156)

0.038**
(0.0154)

Fit

0.89

0.88

0.79

0.96

N

1982

504

944

534

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-2). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.

Table 8 Summary Statistics for the Instrument to the Layoff Cost
The flexibility to fire a worker N
freq
No
1340
22.56
A little bit
2450
41.25
Some
1580
26.60
Quite a bit
500
8.42
flexible
70
1.18
Note: See more discussion for the instrument used for the layoff cost in the text.

53

Table 9 Test for the Effect of Layoff Costs in a Sales shock
Variable

All firms

ln(inventory).L1

0.401***
(0.0546)

ln(sales)

-1.165***
(0.3201)

Layoff2*ln(sales)

1.139***
(0.3952)

Layoff3*ln(sales)

1.122***
(0.3320)

Layoff4*ln(sales)

0.732**
(0.3301)

Layoff5*ln(sales)

0.836**
(0.3403)

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-3). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 10 Test for the (S, s) Model by Different Firm Sizes
Variable

All firms

Small firms

Medium firms

Large firms

ln(inventory).L1

0.223***
(0.0575)

0.215**
(0.0879)

0.346***
(0.0565)

0.303***
(0.105)

ln(sales)

0.227***
(0.0282)

0.213***
(0.0440)

0.302***
(0.043)

0.126**
(0.0620)

Fit

0.80

0.68

0.76

0.79

N

4801

1369

2297

1135

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (5-1). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.

Table 11 Test for the (S, s) Model by Different Industries
Variable

Mining

Light

Chemical

Heavy

Other

0.360***
(0.0993)

0.276***
(0.0771)

0.259**
(0.0890)

-0.0195
(0.0956)

0.316***
(0.0923)

ln(sales)

0.458***
(0.1469)

0.267***
(0.0686)

0.237***
(0.0614)

0.153***
(0.0409)

0.310***
(0.0619)

Fit

0.92

0.77

0.83

0.36

0.84

N

290

1198

877

1862

574

ln(inventory).
L1

Note: This estimation is based on the equation (5-1). All standard errors are robust and reported
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.
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CHAPTER II
PROCESS INNOVATION UNDER COMPETITION
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Abstract
I analyze the relationship between process innovation and market competition. I
find that increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms will
have less incentive for process innovation whether the innovation outcome is
deterministic or stochastic. However, when the number of firms in the market is
proportional to the demand and both increase, then increased price elasticity will induce
firms to devote more effort to conduct process innovation when innovation is
deterministic; and under the stochastic case, an inverted-U shape relation between
innovation effort and market competitiveness is identified. Furthermore, when the
number of firms is endogenous, innovation incentive grows with the size of the market.

2.1 Introduction
The debate over the effect of increasing market competition on firms’ innovation
activities has been controversial since Schumpeter (1934). Competition is one of a great
many factors that affect a firm’s incentive to innovate, such as the market structure, the
protection of property rights, the ability to license a patent, and uncertainty regarding
innovation processes and so on. Market competition can interact with these other factors,
but there is no single model that captures every aspect of innovation and competition, and
therefore the theoretic literature arrives at no consensus regarding the effects of
competition on innovation.
While there are many models that examine the relation between innovation and
competition, two polar views co-exist in the literature. Schumpeter (1934) argues that
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monopoly is temporary, so a monopolist has an incentive to keep innovating to prevent
the entrance of new firms. Furthermore, innovation is costly and risky, therefore only
larger firms have the ability to conduct substantial research and development (R&D). A
long line of literature has followed from this argument that less competition in the market
provides better breeding grounds for innovation.26 On the other hand, Arrow (1962)
assumes that monopolists have perfect protection of their innovations. He compares the
incentives to innovate under both monopoly and competitive markets with a costreducing innovation model, and finds that a monopolist has less incentive to innovate
compared with firms in a competitive market. This is because monopoly has more preinnovation profit, and hence there is a negative relationship between innovation and
monopoly power.
Following these two classic views, various formal models have emerged to
capture the effect of competition on innovation. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) model a
cost-reducing innovation in an oligopoly with N identical firms, and show that firms will
invest less in innovation as the number of firms grows since the output per firm decreases.
This is commonly referred as the “scale effect”. Greenstein and Ramey (1998) assume
that consumers prefer new products to old ones, and a monopolist could use both new and
old products to separate the customers in such a way as to earn more profits than a
competitor who could only earn by selling a new product. Unlike Arrow (1962) where a
monopolist loses pre-innovation profits as it replaces new products with old ones, in this

26

See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b), Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Greenstein and Ramey (1998).
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model a monopolist will gain profits from both the old and new products, higher than
profits in a competitive market. Thus, a monopolist will have a strong incentive to
conduct innovation.
Generally, the theoretical literature examines the relationship between innovation
and competition while representing the level of competition simply as the number of
firms which is assumed to be exogenous. However, the number of firms in a market is
determined by market size, scale economies and other factors such as fixed costs and
barriers to entry. Clearly, as the size of the market grows, more firms will typically enter
the market to capture available profits. Thus, I argue an important step in this literature is
to allow the number of firms to be endogenous in a free entry model with zero profitequilibrium. In this paper, I will first examine how competition affects innovation effort
when the number of firms in the market is proportional to the demand. In this case, the
number of firms grows proportionally with the size of the market so that the number of
customers facing each firm stays the same. With this model I illustrate how competition
affects innovation when neutralizing the scale effect. Then I analyze the effect of the
competition on the innovation when there is a fixed cost involved in the production and
thus the number of firms is endogenously determined by the zero-profit condition.
Innovation is often classified into process innovation or product innovation.
Process innovation reduces production costs through enhancing the efficiency of
production line or management. Product innovation entails developing a new product
which may create a new uncontested market, or, an improved version of a product for
which consumers have higher willingness to pay. A large part of the literature studies the
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effects of competition on innovation while assuming the innovation outcome could be
patented or licensed in the model.27 However, unlike product innovation which is likely
patentable, process innovation is likely to be an ongoing process, and very firm-specific.
Each firm must exert costly effort to improve their production line and lower its marginal
cost.
This cost-reducing innovation process is analogous to some models of managerial
efficiency, in which managers exert costly effort to reduce the firm’s marginal production
cost, and this outcome is firm-specific and nontransferable. Willig (1987) illustrates that
increased competition will reduce the output scale of each firm which leaves managers
less incentive to put forth effort because the value of reducing the marginal cost of
production falls as scale falls. However it will also increase the price elasticity of demand
which induces managers to exert more effort. So the total effect is ambiguous. Schmidt
(1997) finds ambiguous results as well. But instead of relying on increasing price
elasticity, he argues that greater competition will increase the risk of bankruptcy so that
managers are forced to work hard to prevent liquidation.
Martin (1993) develops a model to analyze the firm’s managerial efficiency in a
Cournot market setting. He assumes an inverse linear demand function and the managers
exert costly effort to reduce the firm’s marginal cost. Like Willig, he finds that increased
competition will result in scale and elasticity effects in opposing directions. In his model
he finds that the scale effect dominates so that the managerial effort will fall when the

27

Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) study a cost-reducing innovation which could be licensed, and then be
auctioned or sold at a flat fee.
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number of firms increases. I employ a similar model in this paper with some revisions.
Firms first exert costly effort by which the marginal cost is determined, and then play a
Cournot game. A linear demand function is straightforward and is convenient for
modeling the size of the market which is determined by the slope. A firm’s marginal cost
is an inverse function of innovation effort to represent process innovation as a cost
reducing strategy.
Unlike models of managerial effort, I model the possibility that innovation is a
stochastic process. A principle-agent (P-A) setting is not considered in this paper because
I focus on firm-level incentives. Martin (1993) acknowledges that the P-A framework
was not critical to his findings, and Bertoletti and Poletti (1996) reexamine Martin's
model and show that the results hold in a complete information model, and decreasing
effort with increased competition is driven by increasing return to scale rather than the
asymmetric information between owners and managers.
There are two main findings. When an innovation process is deterministic, an
exogenous increase in the number of firms has a dominant scale effect, and this increased
competition reduces the incentive for process innovation (consistent with Martin’s result).
However, when the number of firms in the market grows proportionally to the demand, or
when the number of firms is endogenously determined in a zero-profit equation, the scale
effect is diminished and increased price elasticity dominates. In this case the increased
competition resulting from a larger market will induce firms to put more effort into
innovation.
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If the innovation process is stochastic, somewhat different results are obtained.
When the number of firms is exogenous, firms have less incentive for process innovation
as before. However, when the number of firms in the market grows proportionally to the
demand, I find that there will be an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort
and market competitiveness. It is intuitive to think that a moderate level of competition
may best promote innovation. When there is very intense competition, the small scale of
firms may lead to little benefit from a new technology, especially for one that reduces
costs rather than opens a new market. However, innovation incentive may be dull in very
concentrated markets because failure to innovate may not reduce the market share
significantly. Most of the literature predicts that the relation between innovation and
competition is monotonic with greatest innovation occurring either with monopoly or
perfect competition.28 However, I obtain the result that moderate level of competition
produces the strongest incentive for innovation when the process is stochastic and the
number of firms is proportional to market size.
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to the existence of a
fixed cost, I show that the number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the
size of the market. Thus this creates a stronger incentive to exert effort for innovation
under increasing competition in this model than when the number of firms proportionally
changes with the size of the market.

28

Kamien and Schwartz (1976) suggest that innovation and competition has an inverted U relation. Aghion
et. al.(2005) assumes that there is a spatial sequence structure finds that firms will devote more effort in
innovation when more firms enter the market at low levels of competition, but they will lose incentives to
innovate at high competition levels
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The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Second 2.2, the basic
model is set up and analyzed under different assumptions regarding innovation process
and the exogeneity or endogeneity of the number of firms. A summary of the results is
presented in Section 2.3.

2.2 The model
2.2.1 The deterministic innovation model

2.2.1.1 The basic model
In the model presented below and in the next few sections, I denote n as the
number of firms in the market, P as market price, q as each firm’s output and Q as the
market output. I also use e as innovation effort, MC as firm’s marginal cost and F as
fixed cost. I begin by assuming a market with an exogenous determined number of firms,
n. Each firm chooses his own output to maximize profit. The demand function is

[  1  \] where b represents the size of the market. When b doubles, the size of the

market will be one half as the original size. This simple linear demand function is both
trackable and facilitates examining the effect of competition on innovation when the
number of firms varies with the size of the market as discussed later.
Firm i will put costly effort ei to conduct process innovation which will reduce the

marginal cost MC` . Once the firm chooses innovation effort, the marginal cost MC is

constant and inversely related with effort, MC 4a where 0 + K. c 1. The cost for


b

process innovation is d K. , where d’ f 0, d’’ f 0, denoting that the return on R&D is
decreasing with effort.
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The firms’ problem is then to choose the output and effort to maximize their
profits:
Yg i.  j. k1  \] 
hb ,ab

The first order conditions are:

1
l  d K. 
1  K.

9i.
1
 1  \j.  \]. 
 j. n \  0
9j.
1  K.

1
9i.
 j. n
 d o K.   0
1  K. 
9K.

2.1.1
2.1.2

2.1.3

Rearrange equation (2.1.2) to obtain
j. 

1
1  \].  1  K

.

2\

2.1.4

Since the firms are identical, I assume symmetry for j. , that is j  j   

j.   jp , thus equation (2.1.4) will be
j. n 

1
11K
2\

Solving for j. n yileds:
j. n 

.



  1j. n
2

1
11K

.

  1\

2.1.5
2.1.6

Substitute equation (2.1.6) into equation (2.1.3), and rearrange to find

K. n
2.1.7
1  K. n 
To examine the effect of competition on innovation effort, I take the partial
  1\d o K. n  

derivative of equation (2.1.7) with respect to n to find:
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\d o K. n     1\d oo K. n 


9K. n
9

1  K. n   K. n n 3 n 1  K. n  9K. n
1  K. n 
9

2.1.8

Simplifying and rearranging the above equation yields:

9K. n
1  2K. n
oo
n 
   1\d K.
 \d o K. n 
9
1  K. n 

From assumption, b and d o K. n  are both positive, so the right hand side of
equation (2.1.9) is positive. Let A=

ab n
4ab n U

2.1.9

   1\d oo K. n  which is the terms in the

parentheses on the left hand side, the sign of the comparative statistics of

Aab n
Ap

is the same

as the sign of A.

Since there is d oo K. n  in A, the Hessian Matrix of the second order condition for

profit maximization will be evaluated.
Ax y

The hession matrix v  w Axy
Ah y

AaAh

Ax y

AhAa
w
Ax y
Aa y

must be negative definite for a unique

max to exist, where

9i 
 \  \  2\
9j 

1
9i 

1  K. n 
9j9K

9i 
1

9K9j
1  K. n 

1
9i 
 2j n
 d oo K. n 

1  K. n 
9K
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Thus, Ahy n Aa y  AhAa n AaAh  2\(2j n
Ax y

Ax y

Ax y

Ax y



4ab n X

 d oo K. n  



4ab n U

must be

positive to ensure the hession matrix is negative definite.
From 2\(2j n

d oo K. n 

d

oo

K.



4ab n X

n

 d oo K. n  



4ab n U

f 0, I identify an inequality condition for

2j n
1

f
1  K. n 
2\ 1  K. n 

2.1.10

Substitute equation (2.1.10) into A to find:

1  2K. n
1
2j n
zc
   1\ k

l
1  K. n 
1  K. n 
2\ 1  K. n 

Substitute equation (2.1.6) into the right hand side of the above equation to obtain:
1
2 1  1  K n
1  2K. n
1
.
zc


1  K. n  2 1  K. n 
1  K. n 

Simplifying the above equation yields:
zc

1
2 1  K. n 

Since there is at least one firm in the market, the right hand side is nonpositive, so A is
strictly less than zero.
Thus

Aab n
Ap

c0

This result that innovation effort declines with n can be illustrated graphically. I

plot   1\d o K. n  and

ab n

4ab n X

on the same graph where the X-axis is effort to give us a

picture of the comparative statistics of

Aab n
Ap

. When the number of firms in the market n
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increases,   1\d o K. n  rotates to the left, and the intersection of these two equations

shifts to the left, and hence the optimal level of K. decreases.

Figure 10 Plot of Equation (2.1.7)

Thus, when the number of firms n increase, the increased competition will shrink
the demand facing individual firms, and firms will put less effort into process innovation.
Proposition 1: Firms will engage in less process innovation as the number of
firms in the market increases when the market size is fixed.

2.2.1.2 Scale neutral model
A more complete model of the competition and the incentive for innovation must
account for how the number of firms is determined. A larger market supports more firms.
In this section, I will examine the effect of competition on innovation when the number
of firms in the market is proportional to the size of the market. This treatment neutralizes
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the scale effect which is dominant in the basic model when the number of firms is
exogenous.
I represent a market where the number of firms is proportional to the size of the

market by employing the demand function [  1  p ]. Here b is a fixed parameter and
}

the demand curve becomes flatter as n grows. In this case, the number of customers per
firm is constant as the size of the market and number of firms change. Holding other
assumptions the same and resolving the model, I obtain
K. n
1
k1  l \d o K. n  
1  K. n 


2.1.11

Similarly, to examine the effect of competition on innovation effort, I take the

partial derivative of equation (2.1.11) with respect to n to obtain:

\
\
9K. n
\ o n
d K.     1 n   n d o K. n     1 d oo K. n 


9

1  K. n   K. n n 3 n 1  K. n  9K. n

1  K. n 
9

2.1.12

Simplifying and rearranging the above equation to find:

\ oo n 9K. n
\ o n
1  2K. n

K



1
d


d K. 
~
.


9
1  K. n 

2.1.13

b and d o K. n  are both positive, so the right hand side of equation (2.1.13) is
negative. Let B=

ab n
4ab n U

   1 p d oo K. n  which is the terms in the parentheses on the
}

left hand side, the sign of the comparative statistics of

Aab n
Ap

is opposite with the sign of B.

Solving Hessian Matrix for this model and I obtain an inequality condition for d oo K. n 
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d oo K. n  f

2j n


1  K. n 
2\ 1  K. n 

2.1.14

Substituting equation (2.1.14) and the profit maximizing output qn into B, and simplifying
to find:

c

1
2 1  K. n 

This term is exactly the same as A in the basic model, and it is strictly less than zero.
Thus

Aab n
Ap

f0

Figure 11 Plot of Equation (2.1.11)

Figure 11 is the plot of equation (2.1.11). When the number of firms n increases,

the curve of 1  p \d o K. n  will shift downwards, and the intersection for the optimal


level of effort will increase. In this case, the number of firms in the market is proportional
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to the demand, that is, the number of customers per firm remains the same. However as n
grows, price elasticity increases and firms conduct greater process innovation.
Proposition 2: When the number of firms is proportional to demand with the
customers per firm remaining the same, the price elasticity effect dominates. Firms will
devote more effort to process innovation as the number of firms and market size grow.

2.2.1.3 Endogenous number of firms
In this section, I assume the number of firms is endogenous and constrained by
nonnegative profits. A fixed cost F is introduced. Solving for nonnegative profit
constraint I will find the number of firms is a function of effort and fixed cost.
i.n  j. n k1  \] n 

1
l  d K. n   
1  K. n

0

2.1.15

Substitute equation (2.1.6) into the above equation to obtain:
1
11K n
.

  1\

1   n

1
11K n
  1

.



1

1  K. n

  d K. n 

Multiplying terms, this expression becomes
K. n


1
1  K. n
1  K. n
1 



  1\
1
1
1  K. n

  d K. n 

Summing terms in parentheses yields
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1
K. n
1
1  K. n
1  K. n



1
  1\   1

  d K. n 

The left hand side then reduces to
K. n 
1  K. n 
  1 \

  d K. n 

Isolating the term containing n gives us
K. n 
1  K. n 
  1 +
  d K. n \
Finally, when this expression holds with equality, this defines n* as
n 

K. n
1  K. n

   d K. n \

1

2.1.16

This expression must hold such that K. n is the profit maximizing effort and j. n the

profit maximizing output given there are n* firms exist in the market. This defines the

relationship between n* and e*. When the fixed cost increases, the number of firms will
decrease. Moreover, when the size of the market doubles, n increases but to less than
twice the original number. In this case, the number of firms will increase but not
proportionally with the size of the market.
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I substitute equation (2.1.16) into expression for q*, which is equation (2.1.6), to
indentify q* as only a function of fixed cost F, the size of the market b, and the effort e,
and the effort cost function c(e).
1
11K

K.
  d K. 
1

K.
.

j. n 


K.
  1\
\
1  K.
n\
   d K. \

2.1.17

Insert equation 2.1.16 into (2.1.7) yields:
K.
1  K.

   d K. \

\d o 

K. n
1  K. n 

This expression implicitly defines e* as a function of all exogenous factors.
Simplifying this expression becomes
1
\ n d o K. n 

1  K. n 
  d K. 

  d K.   1  K. n  n d o K. n  n \

2.1.18

To see how the optimal effort level change in response to the size of the market b
changes, taking partial derivative of equation (2.1.18) with respect to b to obtain:
4 1  K. n 

Aab n
A}

n d o K. n  n \  1  K. n  n 2d o K. n  n d oo K. n  n

1  K. n  n d o K. n   d o K. n  n

Aab n
A}

Aab n
A}

n\

Rearrange to find:

4\ 1  K. n  n d o K. n   2\d o K. n  n d oo K. n  1  K. n   d o K. n 

 1  K. n  n d o K. n 

Aab n
A}



2.1.19
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The right hand side of the equation (2.1.19) is negative, and let   4\ 1 

K. n  n d o K. n   2\d o K. n  n d oo K. n  1  K. n   d o K. n , the sign of the comparative
statistics of

Aab n
A}

should be opposite with the sign of C.

Substitute the inequality condition (2.1.10) for d oo K. n  into C to obtain
 f 4\ 1  K. n  n d o K. n 

2d o K. n 
1

 1  K. n   d o K. n 
 2\d K.  n 
2\ 1  K. n  1  K. n
o

n

The right hand side is then 4\ 1  K. n  n d o K. n   d o K. n   4\ 1  K. n  n
d o K. n   d o K. n   0

So C is strictly positive, and thus

Aab n
A}

c0

That is to say, when the size of the market increases, the number of firms in the
market increases as well but not proportionally, firms will face more demand, and put
more effort in the R&D research for process innovation.
Proposition 3: When the number of firms is endogenous, firms will devote more
effort for process innovation if the size of the market increases making it more
competitive.
2.2.2 The stochastic innovation model

2.2.2.1 The basic model
The innovation function is deterministic in the basic model, but innovation is
often an uncertain process, and a firm may achieve nothing despite significant effort, or
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achieve success without great effort. In this section I model a stochastic innovation
process.
Again, I first assume there are n identical firms in the market, and demand

function is [  1  \]. In period 1, firms choose their innovation effort, which, if

successful, will reduce the marginal cost. For trackability, I assume there are two possible
levels of marginal cost for each firm i, .  5, 5, and 0 c 5 c 5 c 1. The probability

of being a low type is a function of effort, D\.  5  1 K. , where f’>0, f’’<0,

f(0)=0. In period 2, firms realize their own marginal cost which is observable to all firms
in the market. And in period 3, firms play an asymmetric Cournot game to choose the
output to maximize their profits.
This is a sequential game so I solve this model backwards. In period 3, firm i

faces a market with m low types and n-m-1 high types.
Suppose that at time 3 firm i is a low type, then there are m+1 low types and n-m1 high types in the market, and the firm chooses the quantity to maximize the profits:
Yg i  j 1  \]  5
h

The first order condition is:

9i
 1  \]  5  j n \  0
9j

2.2.1

]    1j      1j

2.2.2

Imposing symmetry,

Substitute equation (2.2.2) into (2.2.1) to obtain
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1  \   1j      1j &  5  \j
jn 

 1  \   2j  \     1j  5  0

15
1 n

j
\   2
2

2.2.3

For high type firms, their problem is
Yg i  j 1  \]  5
h

The first order condition is:

9i
 1  \]  5  j n \  0
9j

1  \   1j      1j &  5  \j  1  \   1j  \   j  5
jn 

0

1  5
1 n

j
\       

2.2.4

1
1    5      15&
\   1

2.2.5

1
1    15    25&
\   1

2.2.6

Substitute (2.2.4) into (2.2.3) to find
jn 

Substitute (2.2.5) into (2.2.4) yileds
jn 

when  +   1, jn is nonnegative. Thus I will assume  +



 

 1 to ensure

there is no corner solution in this Cournot game. That is, I assume innovation is not so
dramatic that firms which fail to innovate will exit market.
Substitute (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) into (2.2.2) to obtain
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]n 

1
    15      15&
\   1

in 

1
1    5      15& 
\   1

Thus,

[n  1  ] n  1 

1
    15      15&
\   1

2.2.7

2.2.8

Now suppose at time 3 firm i is high type. Then there are m low types and n-m
high types in the market, and the firm chooses the quantity to maximize the profits:
Yg i  j 1  \]  5
h

The first order condition is:

9i
 1  \]  5  j n \  0
9j

2.2.9

]  j    j

2.2.10

Imposing symmetry,

Substitute (2.2.10) into (2.2.9) to find

1  \j    j &  5  \j  1  \j  \     1j  5  0
jn 

1  5


jn
\     1     1 

2.2.11

For low type firms, their problem is
Yg i  j 1  \]  5
h

The first order condition is:

9i
 1  \]  5  j n \  0
9j

2.2.12
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1  \j    j &  5  \j  1  \   1j  \   j  5  0

jn 

15
 n

j
\   1   1 

2.2.13

1
1  5    15&
\   1

2.2.14

1
1      15    5&
\   1

2.2.15

Substitute (2.2.13) into (2.2.11) to obtain
jn 

Substitute (2.2.14) into (2.2.13) yields
jn 

Substitute (2.2.14) and (2.2.15) into (2.2.10) to find
]n 

1
  5    5&
\   1

in 

1

1  5    15

\   1

Thus,

[n  1  ] n  1 

1
  5    5&
\   1

2.2.16

2.2.17

Combining results from these two cases , for firm i between being high and low
type, given there are m other firms are low, the difference of the profits between low type
and high type firms is
 in  in 
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2
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\   1

2.2.18
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Let   1 K. , and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is

independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution.
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5  52  5    25  2   15  5

2.2.19)

In period 1, firm i chooses its effort to maximize the expected profit:

Yg
ab

Where

i n   K.

i n   1 K. 

in   1  1 K. 

The first order condition is then:

in   1 K. 



in 
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1¥ K.n 

1

Substitute the expression of

n
symmetry, K.n  K.
, " obatin
p

} p4y

2.2.20

 into the above equation to solve for e*i , and impose

5  52  5    25  2   11 K.n 5  51 o K.n   1 2.2.21

The number of firms in the market captures the competiveness in this case, and in order
to examine the relation between innovation and competition, I take partial derivative of
equation (2.2.21) with respect to the number of firms n to find:
1 oo K.n 
n

where

9K. n
9
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p4y
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5  52  5    25  2   11 K.n 5  5 2.2.22

Rearrange yields:
1 oo K.n 
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 1 o K.n 

n
n
9
9K. n
9
n
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91 K.n  9
9

Since 1 o K.n  f 0 YZ 1 oo K.n  c 0 by assumption, and I could get
AB § n 
A¨abn 

 }

1 o K.n 

p

p4y

n



, which is on the left hand side of the eqation 2.2.23, is negatvie.

AB § n 
A¨abn 

2   15  5 c 0 from equation (2.2.22), thus 1 oo K.n 

2.2.23

To find the sign of

AB § n 
Ap

, I take the difference of

n

when the number of firms is n

and n+1.
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Therefore, the right hand side of the equation (2.2.23) is positive, and hence

Aab n
Ap

c 0.

This result is the same with the deterministic case.
Proposition 4a: The more firms in the market, the less efforts firms will put to conduct
process innovation even when the innovation result is stochastic. Scale effect dominates.
To examine the effect of market competiveness on the expected price, I
calculated the expected price and take partial derivative with respect to the number of
firms n:

The expected price
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Analogously, ∑p¡3 p¡  ¡ 1  p¡   ¢5  5  5
Thus,
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1 1


1
1  5  5  5
1

2.2.24

Taking partial derivative with respect to the number of firms n:
9

[n  5  5  5   1  1  5  5  5

9
  1

Since 5 c 5 c 1,
9



5  5  5  1
  1

2.2.25

[n 
c0
9

That is to say, the expected price will decrease when the number of firms in the market
increases.
Proposition 4b: The expected price will decrease as the number of firms in the
market increases when the innovation result is stochastic.

2.2.2.2 Scale neutral model
As I did earlier in the deterministic innovation model, I now assume the number
of firms in the market is proportional to the size of the market. In order to neutralize the

scale effect, the demand function then becomes [  1  p ]. Holding other assumptions
}

the same with the basic model, resolving the profits maximization problem in period 3 to
obtain
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n
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py

p4y

5  52  5    25  2   11 K.n 5  5 2.2.26)

In period 1, firm i chooses the effort to maximize the expected profit:
i n   K.

Yg
ab

The first order condition and the comparative statistics are the same with the basic model
expect the functional form of E Z n  is slightly different:
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2.2.20

2.2.23

is negative. To examine the sign of

when the number of firms is n and n+1, but this

cannot be signed in general. I conducted a simulation to show how market
competitiveness affects the optimal level of innovation effort in this model.

I first calculate the expected values of jn , jn YZ ] n , and run simulation to

examine the relation between those quantities and the number of firms.

When there are m low types firms and n-m high types firms in the market,
jn 
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Let Y  1 K, and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is

independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution.
83

jn 

p


  k l Y ¡ 1  Yp¡ jn
¢
¡3

E(jn   }
]n 

p




1    na  15
\   1

   Y5&

p4

1  Y5  Y  15&


  Y5    Y5&
\   1

Figures 12-15 are the simulation results given the functional form 1 K.   1 

Kg K. . Figure 12 shows that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between the

number of firms in the market and innovation effort. Starting from a small market and
few firms, as market size and the number of firms grow together, firms exert more
innovation effort; However, as market size and the number of firms become large,
eventually firms will have less incentive to engage in process innovation because there
are likely to be many successful innovations in the market and thus little realized profit
even for these firms.
Figures 13-15 show that when the number of firms increases, low type firms will
produce more and the market output will increase. However, high type firms will produce
more when there are a few firms in the market, but as there are more and more firms in
the market, the optimal quantity for the high type firms will decrease.

I tried different functional forms of f K. , and also changed the parameter value of

for 1 5, 5 and \ robustness check, and obtain the similar results. As is evident from
simulation,

Aab n
Ap

cannot be signed in general.
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Figure 12 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on Innovation Effort When the
Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market

Figure 13 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of Low
Type Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market
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Figure 14 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of High
Type Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market

Figure 15 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of All
Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market

Proposition 5: When the number of firms is proportional to the demand and
innovation result is stochastic, there is an inverted-U shape relationship between the
number of firms in the market and innovation effort. That is, firms will exert more
innovation effort in a small market competing with a few firms; however, as there are
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more and more firms entering the market, firms will have less incentive to conduct
process innovation.

2.2.2.3 Endogenous number of firms
I now assume there is a fixed cost F for each firm, and the number of firms in the
market is endogenous.

i n   1 K. 

where in  }
n

}

p



p4y

p4y

Solving for

n
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1  5    15



5  52  5    25  21 K.    15  5
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i n  }



p4y

2.2.16

2.2.21)

±21 K.  1  55  5  1  5   1 K.  

11K121K2&552

Solving for nonnegative profit constraint

i n   K.

of firms is a function of effort, fixed cost, 5, 5 and \.

2.2.27)

0, I will find the number

In period 1, firm i chooses the effort to maximize the expected profit:

Yg
ab

i n   K.

The first order condition is:
1¥ K.n 

n

1

Solving K.n from equation 2.2.20to obtain K.n is a function of fixed

2.2.20

cost, 5, 5 and \.
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I couldn’t obtain the analytic results for

Aab n
A}

, so I used simulation to see how the

size of the market affect innovation effort.

Analogously, I calculate the expected values of jn , jn YZ ] n , and run simulation

to examine the relation between quantities and the number of firms.

When there are m low types firms and n-m high types firms in the market,
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1
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Let Y  1 K, and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is

independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution.
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Figures 16-20 are the simulation results assuming the functional form 1 K.  

1  Kg K. . Figures 16 and 17show that when the size of the firms in the market

increases, the number of firms increases but less than proportionally, and firms will put
more effort for innovation. Note that fixed cost F is sufficiently large that high cost firms
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stay in the market. Figures 18-20 present the effect of market competitiveness on the
expected output, and the results are similar to what I found in the last model. I did
robustness check as well with alternative functional forms, and similar results are
obtained.

Figure 16 The Effect of the Market Size on the Number of Firms in Equilibrium
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Figure 17 The Effect of the Market Size on Innovation Effort When the Number of
Firms is Endogenous

Figure 18 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of Low Type Firms
When the Number of Firms is Endogenous

Figure 19 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of High Type
Firms When the Number of Firms is Endogenous
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Figure 20 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of All Firms When
the Number of Firms is Endogenous

Proposition 6: When the number of firms is endogenous, firms will devote more
effort for process innovation as the size of the market increases when the innovation
result is stochastic.
Compared with proposition 5 where firms will exert more innovation effort in a
small market competing with a few firms, but have less incentive to conduct process
innovation as there are more and more firms in the market, in this case, firms will
definitely devote more effort for process innovation as competition increases due to
increasing market size. That is because, the model that delivers proposition 5 assumes the
number of firms proportionally increases with the size of the market, but in the model
with proposition 6, I show that with a fixed cost, the number of firms will increase but
less than proportionally with the size of the market. Holding other conditions the same,
customers each firm will be more for the model with a fixed cost. Thus firms will have
stronger incentive to put more effort for innovation when there is more competition for
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the model with endogenous number of firms due to a fixed cost than the model where the
number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.

2.3 Conclusion
Since Schumpeter pointed out that innovative activity is related to competition,
economists have developed various models to examine this relationship. However, there
is no paper so far considering endogenous number of firms in the model, and
deterministic innovation process is commonly assumed. In this paper, I employed a
model similar to Martin’s managerial efficiency model. I compared the results from the
models with exogenous and endogenous number of firms, and innovation process is
assumed to be either deterministic or stochastic. I find that when innovation process is
deterministic, the basic results are consistent with Martin (1993). As the number of firms
is exogenous, increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms
then have less incentive for process innovation. However, when the market could support
more firms, such as the number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand,
or the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, the scale effect is diminished,
and increased price elasticity dominates in this case which will induce firms to put more
effort into innovation. Thus more competition will induce firms to devote more effort in
innovation.
When innovation process is stochastic, ambiguous results are obtained when the
number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand. I find that there will be
an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness.
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, I show that the
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number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the size of the market, and
firms will have stronger inventive to put more effort for innovation under increasing
competition for the model with endogenous number of firms due to fixed cost than the
model where the number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I examine firm’s behavior from the manager’s view. In
chapter one, I examine inventory behavior using Chinese firm level data. By analyzing
the original production smoothing/buffer stock model, ambiguous relation between sales
shock and inventory investment are obtained. In addition, the labor force is found to be a
crucial component of the model and excluding it from the estimation leads to biased
results. To date, this is the first paper that considers the impact of the labor force in the
empirical test of inventory behavior. Using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769
manufacturing firms from 1980 to 1989, finished goods inventory is used to test the
production smoothing/buffer stock model which involves the rising marginal cost when
planning production, while inventory of raw materials is applied to test the (S ,s) model
assuming a fixed delivery cost. I find that the variance of the annual gross output is
smaller than that of the sales revenues of products. In particular, small firms in heavy
industry show strong evidence to use inventory to smooth production and buffer demand
shocks. Moreover, sales are positively correlated with investment in raw materials, but
negatively correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. This is consistent with
the predictions from both the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s)
model. Furthermore, the labor force is found to be positively related with demand as well
as the inventory, which indicates that excluding the labor force in the estimation will
cause biased results. This explains why previous studies found contradicting results to the
theoretical predictions.
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In chapter two, the relation between innovative activity and market competition is
modeled and analyzed. I employed a model similar to Martin’s managerial efficiency
model. I compared the results from the models with exogenous and endogenous number
of firms, and innovation process is assumed to be either deterministic or stochastic. I find
that when innovation process is deterministic, the basic results are consistent with Martin
(1993). As the number of firms is exogenous, increased competition will shrink the
demand facing each firm, and firms then have less incentive for process innovation.
However, when the market could support more firms, such as the number of firms in the
market grows proportional to the demand, or the number of firms is endogenous due to a
fixed cost, the scale effect is diminished, and increased price elasticity dominates in this
case which will induce firms to put more effort into innovation. Thus more competition
will induce firms to devote more effort in innovation.
When innovation process is stochastic, ambiguous results are obtained when the
number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand. I find that there will be
an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness.
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, I show that the
number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the size of the market, and
firms will have stronger inventive to put more effort for innovation under increasing
competition for the model with endogenous number of firms due to fixed cost than the
model where the number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.
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